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ABSTRACT 
 Defending houses of worship has become an ever-increasing need in homeland 
security. The rise of threats against faith-based organizations is growing, and the unique 
nature of sanctuaries makes them an ever-increasing soft target. What security help can 
assist houses of worship, and how can homeland security experts advise faith-based 
organizations? 
 This thesis employs an appreciative inquiry approach to define the security 
problem that houses of worship face in specific threats and hurdles unique to them. 
Chapters review available resources at the government level, in the commercial space, 
and by faith-based organizations themselves. The material was then synthesized by 
developing an emergency operations plan for one house of worship: Northminster 
Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona. This thesis suggests that overcoming the 
hurdles to security strategies within a house of worship is much more nuanced than 
previously believed, and the construction of a security plan for any house of worship is 
far more difficult than previously understood. Rather than seeking a one-size-fits-all or a 
packaged solution, houses of worship would best be served by engaging in a local effort 
to analyze security challenges and solutions. Little empirical study treats how houses of 
worship use, acquire, and find value in protection strategies on their campuses, and this 
thesis starts the conversation into this rarely discussed space. 
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Institutions particularly vulnerable to attack due to a lack of security measures and 
a high concentration of people are what analysts typically refer to as soft targets.1 The 
unique nature of a house of worship, with its inviting atmosphere and open doors, limits 
the constructs available to develop holistic security plans for these soft targets. How can 
homeland security experts assist in resolving security matters in the religious space, 
especially when houses of worship lack the resources to protect themselves?  
In looking for targets to select, terrorists, as rational actors, will choose a target 
that inspires the greatest fear and spreads their message.2 The softer the target, the greater 
effect is a cornerstone of the terrorist attack strategy. The action of hardening a target will 
increase the perceived cost to terrorist actors, which causes them to make the rational 
decision not to attack the target. Deterrence by denial involves taking soft targets and 
making them too difficult to attack without excessive costs and planning.3 Houses of 
worship sit as some to the most vulnerable soft targets and how soft target mitigation 
deterrence strategies are utilized is the impetus of this thesis. 
Using an Appreciative Inquiry Model, this thesis seeks to develop a portfolio that 
homeland security experts can use to assist in the development and implementation of 
security plans in houses of worship.4 The Appreciative Inquiry Model has five steps: 
define, discover, dream, design, and deliver.5 The first step exactly defines the scope of 
the thesis as it relates to securing religious spaces: soft space protection strategies that 
will best fit in the religious space. The discovery phase researches three distinct areas of 
                                                 
1 Zdeněk Kalvach et al., Basics of Soft Target Protection Guidelines (Prague, Czech Republic: Soft 
Targets Protection Institute, 2018), 6, https://www.scribd.com/document/364123427/Basics-of-Soft-Target-
Protection-Guidelines. 
2 Victor H. Asal et al., “The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection,” Journal of 
Applied Security Research 4, no. 3 (2009): 260, https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610902929990.  
3 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 91, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.87. 
4 “5-D Cycle of Appreciative Inquiry,” The Appreciative Inquiry Commons (blog), accessed September 
23, 2018, https://appreciativeinquiry.champlain.edu/learn/appreciative-inquiry-introduction/5-d-cycle-
appreciative-inquiry/. 
5 The Appreciative Inquiry Commons (blog). 
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soft space security: current programs utilized by houses of worship, government 
programs to assist religious organizations, and commercially offered programs for houses 
of worship. Once a large data set of strategies and plans is unearthed, the next phase 
analyzes the next best steps and attempts to envision the best possible plans for houses of 
worship. Within the design and delivery phases, an actual security plan is developed for 
Northminster Presbyterian Church (NPC) with the goal of extracting the best strategies 
and research to apply it to a real-world scenario. In delivering an emergency operations 
plan within a microcosm of one venue, many valuable lessons can be applied to other 
faith-based organizations.  
Religious spaces are vulnerable and the symbolic nature of acts against a house of 
worship makes them a prime target for various criminal and terrorist actors. In 
combination with the threat is the lack of preparedness that houses of worship face as 
their strained resources and unique hurdles set up roadblocks that prevent the majority of 
religious institutions from having a plan at all.6 A lack of a plan is not from a lack of 
resources, though. Resources abound from government agencies, private vendors, and 
other religious institutions to assist in securing houses of worship. Homeland security 
experts have outlined the threats to religious spaces and provided the tactics and 
strategies necessary to assist in the protection of these unique spaces. Guides, audits, 
exercises, webinars, public events, and information networks have been created at the 
federal level to assist houses of worship. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency are active in assisting 
faith-based organizations at every level of preparedness, planning, and mitigation. 
Religious institutions also have developed their own networks and security teams to build 
resiliency, prepare for possible threats, and mitigate hazards. If neither is of interest to a 
faith-based organization, commercial programs offered by insurance companies and 
vendors offer holistic security systems for faith-based organizations. 
As a real world exercise, the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, along with the webinar recorded on July 25, 
                                                 
6 “Church Security Assessment,” Sheepdog Church Security, accessed October 7, 2019, 
https://sheepdogchurchsecurity.net/. 
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2013 by the Department of Education in conjunction with FEMA, was used to frame and 
develop a security plan for NPC.7 Protective security advisors from the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency came to NPC to perform what is known as an “assist 
visit,” which is an audit of a commercial soft target space.8 The Safety Committee then 
developed an emergency operations plan based on best practices found throughout the 
soft target security space landscape. The committee has not completed the work of 
developing a plan, which speaks to the difficulty of the task that houses of worship 
encounter when developing a plan. The complexity of security on a diverse campus, 
while integrating multiple voices, is a major hurdle for faith-based organizations. The 
dedication and time required to follow through can easily explain why NPC is in the third 
iteration of a security planning team. 
Those not committed to planning and modifying their soft spaces leave 
themselves most vulnerable as the threat continues to grow. Houses of worship are 
particularly vulnerable and have become an ever-increasing target in recent years.9 
Assessing vulnerabilities and then planning for the worst-case scenarios are an integral 
step in defending the sacred spaces that religious orders occupy. More steps must be 
taken beyond planning for a response to threats and more must be done to determine the 
effectiveness of strategies already employed. As seen with the development of an 
emergency operations plan at NPC, the process of creating a plan is in itself inherently 
valuable and allows a faith-based community to answer questions necessary to improving 
site security.  
                                                 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1919-25045-2833/
developing_eops_for_houses_of_worship_final.pdf; REMS Technical Assistance Center, “An Overview of 
the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship Webinar,” 
Department of Education, July 25, 2013, https://rems.ed.gov/OverviewEmergencyOperationsPlans.aspx. 
8 “Assist Visits,” Department of Homeland Security, June 4, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/assist-
visits. 
9 Andrea Lebron, “Are Church Massacres in the United States on the Rise?,” Rave Mobile Safety 
(blog), June 26, 2019, https://www.ravemobilesafety.com/blog/are-church-massacres-in-the-united-states-
on-the-rise. 
xiv 
The various resources available to houses of worship and the roadblocks to 
implementation of any plan are outlined, but many avenues of research are still needed to 
obtain a full picture of the faith-based security landscape. Investigation into 
implementation is the next step. Questions remain as to who is using the plans, at what 
level they are being implemented, and are faith-based organizations continuing to plan as 
the threat evolves. Plans outlined have not necessarily been evaluated for effectiveness, 
whether the federal government or individual entities developed them. The Department of 
Homeland Security measures plans through a protective measure index, which evaluates 
the weakest links in a security structure through resiliency measures.10 Research into the 
difficulties of execution has not been discussed. The most pressing questions are what 
actually happened during active assailant events in a house of worship and what are the 
lessons learned that could be disseminated to other communities. Acknowledgement of 
the issues surrounding domestic violence within the religious community and creating 
tools to combat domestic violence through houses of worship was frequently discussed in 
various sources for this thesis and needs further development. Houses of worship and 
their role in disaster preparedness and recovery is another avenue worth exploring. 
This thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive look at the security landscape for 
houses of worship and filter them through the creation of a security plan for an individual 
faith-based organization. The difficulty of creating an emergency operations plan for an 
individual congregation is representative of the information found regarding church 
security. There are many voices, many ways to get to the finish line, and many ways to 
fall off the path and end up without improving the security posture of the sacred space. 
Site audits, planning committees, federal and local resources, and other religious orders 
are great places for a house of worship to start. Homeland security experts are just one 
key piece of the security puzzle for faith-based organizations. Internal security and threat 
mitigation planning has taken on a life of its’ own within houses of worship, and 
especially within minority communities of the Jewish and Muslim faith. Sharing of 
lessons learned by faith-based organizations can have a lasting effect of communal 
                                                 
10 F. D. Petit et al., Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
(Lemont, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, 2013), 1.  
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integration and collaboration, strengthen the community, lessen the risk of attack, and 
create resiliency amongst attendees. 
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An Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sympathizer is arrested after planning an 
attack on a synagogue in Toledo.1 A murderous rampage takes place at The Tree of Life 
Synagogue on the Sabbath.2 Sutherland Springs First Baptist Church suffers horrific loss 
of life when a lone shooter murders 26 parishioners.3 Even though mass shootings have 
entered the realm of commonplace, targeted attacks on unsuspecting worshippers still 
evokes a particular abhorrence.4 Yet, very little has been done to harden the defenses of 
religious communities. Only 20 percent to 25 percent of churches have some form of 
security plan in place and a year after the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting, a survey of 
154 synagogues revealed that 30 percent still had no plan for responding to a threat on 
their premises.5  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The unique nature of a house of worship, with its inviting atmosphere and open 
doors, limits the constructs available to develop holistic security plans. Such private firms 
as Full Armor Church, LLC have plans to assist houses of worship in creating a security 
ministry or strategy and no empirical inquiry suggests any ideas being presented are truly 
                                                 
1 David K. Li, Brandy Zadrozny, and Ben Collins, “Alleged ISIS Supporter and Woman Accused of 
Planning Terror Attack Arrested,” NBC News, December 10, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/alleged-supporters-isis-nazis-arrested-two-separate-ohio-terror-cases-n946111. 
2 Kalhan Rosenblatt, Tom Winter, and Jonathon Dienst, “Shooting at Pittsburgh Synagogue: At Least 
11 Dead, Suspect in Custody,” NBC News, October 27, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/active-shooter-reported-near-pittsburgh-synagogue-n925211. 
3 David Montgomery, Christopher Mele, and Manny Fernandez, “Gunman Kills at Least 26 in Attack 
on Rural Texas Church,” New York Times, January 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/
us/church-shooting-texas.html. 
4 Michael J. Fagel and Jennifer L. Hesterman, eds., Soft Targets and Crisis Management: What 
Emergency Planners and Security Professionals Need to Know (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2017), 246. 
5 United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, After Pittsburgh: A Survey of Action, Plans and 
Attitudes towards Synagogue Security and Safety (New York City: United Synagogue of Conservative 
Judaism, 2018), 8, https://uscj.org/assets/resources/2018-Security-Survey-Report-Summary.pdf; Larry 
Knight, “Too Few Churches Have Security and Emergency Plans,” Church Executive, September 30, 2011, 
https://churchexecutive.com/archives/too-few-churches-have-security-and-emergency-plans. 
2 
useful.6 Valuable information in the security space is applicable to faith-based 
organizations (FBOs)—for example, the plans developed by Jennifer Hesterman—but the 
unique nature of the religious space is absent, and religious institutions are dealt with as 
though they have the same security needs as a shopping mall or school.7 A lack of 
empirical research leaves agencies with very little guidance of value to provide to 
religious institutions requesting assistance. Religious institutions lack the proper training 
and skills to create their security plans independently. Due to the inherent separation 
between the church and the state, collaborative efforts meet resistance by both sides. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can homeland security experts assist in resolving security matters in the 
religious space, especially where houses of worship lack the resources to protect 
themselves? 
C. SOFT TARGETS 
Institutions particularly vulnerable to attack due to a lack of security measures and 
a high concentration of people are what analysts typically refer to as soft targets.8 The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines soft targets within a framework that 
includes crowded spaces. The DHS defines a soft target as “locations that are easily 
accessible to large numbers of people and that have limited security or protective 
measures in place making them vulnerable to attack.”9 Jennifer Hesterman defines a soft 
target as a civilian venue less protected and more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.10  
                                                 
6 “Church Security Team Ministry Operations Kit,” Full Armor Church, accessed October 21, 2018, 
http://www.fullarmorchurch.com/product/church-security-ministry-operations-kit/. 
7 Jennifer Hesterman, Soft Target Hardening: Protecting People from Attack (Washington, DC: CRC 
Press, 2014), 101, https://doi.org/10.1201/b17914. 
8 Zdeněk Kalvach et al., Basics of Soft Target Protection Guidelines (Prague, Czech Republic: Soft 
Targets Protection Institute, 2018), 6, https://www.scribd.com/document/364123427/Basics-of-Soft-Target-
Protection-Guidelines. 
9 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Soft Targets and Crowded 
Places Security Plan Overview (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), iii, 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/securing-soft-targets-and-crowded-places. 
10 Fagel and Hesterman, Soft Targets and Crisis Management, 2. 
3 
Schmid explains that terrorists partly choose symbolic targets for intimidation, 
coercion, or propaganda, which turn them into targets of attention, targets of terror, or 
targets of demand.11 Asal et al. explain that soft targets, being targets of attention or 
targets of violence, are particularly vulnerable and are the focus of terrorist plots.12 The 
authors of “The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection” argue that soft 
targets are easy because they are unlikely to see themselves as targets and take very little 
precautions to prevent it.13 Those wishing to instill terror also select targets that guarantee 
a higher level of success, especially when they have limited resources.14 When soft 
targets are privately held, another layer of complexities arises since security and 
management of any risks are the responsibility of the owner.15 These privately held 
spaces make attractive targets for terrorists because multiple entrances, exits, and easy 
vehicle access make them easy to exploit.16 Clarke and Serena explain that the number of 
soft targets is nearly endless.17 Houses of worship and religious institutions fall into this 
category.  
Considerable resources, though, are spent at the federal, state, and local level to 
protect privately held soft targets. Super Bowl LII, a private event, was considered a soft 
target. Local security expenditures on the event totaled $6.08 million.18 The DHS 
considers the Super Bowl and such events as the Indianapolis 500 to be matters of 
                                                 
11 Alex Peter Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011), 
61. 
12 Victor H. Asal et al., “The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection,” Journal of 
Applied Security Research 4, no. 3 (2009): 259, https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610902929990.  
13 Asal et al., 259. 
14 Hans Mathias Moeller, “Why Soft Target Terrorist Attacks Will Remain a Threat,” Global Risk 
Insights, July 26, 2016, https://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/soft-target-terrorist-attacks/. 
15 Fagel and Hesterman, Soft Targets and Crisis Management, 3. 
16 Moeller, “Why Soft Target Terrorist Attacks Will Remain a Threat.” 
17 Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena, “How to Harden America’s Soft Targets,” The National 
Interest, July 3, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-harden-americas-soft-targets-21402. 
18 Janet Moore, “Security Deployed at Super Bowl Is Largest in Minnesota History,” Star Tribune, 
January 27, 2018, http://www.startribune.com/security-deployed-at-super-bowl-largest-in-minnesota-
history/471452694/. 
4 
national security, and thus label them as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR).19 
The SEAR rating—determined by an algorithm based on attendance, facility type, and 
iconic value—affords an event special status that includes a coordinated security 
response from the federal, state, and local level.20 If a target is of high value to a 
perceived threat, whether it is in the public or private sphere, the government has shown a 
duty to respond.  
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, airport security was moved from the 
private sector to the government in response to the possibility of additional threats. The 
federal government now spends approximately $4.175 billion on the Transportation and 
Security Administration to protect the public and private structures.21 Although private 
industry has a “duty to care” and protect and is liable if it does not make reasonable steps 
to ensure the safety of customers, the federal government involves itself at multiple levels 
of soft target security.22 Direct government involvement in soft target security represents 
a shift in public involvement in commercial affairs. An industry previously expected to 
protect itself is now working with the government on protection strategies. The basic 
legal framework and past practices of the federal government uphold the concept that the 
protection of privately held soft targets is in the best interest of the public. 
                                                 
19 Mass Gathering Security: A Look at the Coordinated Approach to Super Bowl XLVIII in New Jersey 
and Other Large-Scale Events: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 




20 H.R., Mass Gathering Security, 7. 
21 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration Budget Overview 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 20, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/TSA%20FY18%20Budget.pdf. 
22 George S. Rigakos et al., “Soft Targets? A National Survey of the Preparedness of Large Retail 
Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist Attack after 9/11,” Security Journal 22, no. 4 (October 2009): 
289, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fpalgrave.sj.8350084. 
5 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The convergence of religion and security is a slowly growing field of study23. 
Security matters within houses of worship fall in the realm of what is known as soft 
targets and soft target mitigation theory addresses the development of counter measures 
to “harden” vulnerable spaces, and is as important as the legal framework surrounding the 
intersection of church and state. It is not only a question of how can homeland security 
assist faith-based organizations with securing their premises, but also a matter of can a 
federal system with a clear line between the church and state reach out to religious 
organizations to lessen the potential of attacks on a vulnerable soft target.  
1. Legal Applicability 
Americans have always been leery of government involvement in religious 
institutions, and more recently, extremely cautious of religious involvement in 
government institutions.24 The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and the line between the government and the 
religious bodies of the United States has been redrawn endless times.25 In the past, the 
line excluded federal funds from being used by any religious organization. As early as the 
1990s, this thought process changed as secular religious activities started to receive 
federal funding. Based on Bowen v. Kendrick, legislation expanded the use of federal 
grants in religious venues for non-religious activity.26 After September 11, federal money 
                                                 
23 James K. Wellman Jr. and Clark Lombardi, Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 18. 
24 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 484, Proquest. 
25 “United States of America’s Constitution of 1789 with Amendments through 1992,” The Bill of 
Rights, Amendment 1, Constitute, accessed January 24, 2019, https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/United_States_of_America_1992. 
26 Jonathan A. Wright, Separation of Church and State, Historical Guides to Controversial Issues in 
America (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2010), 147. 
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began to be appropriated for the protection of soft targets, as part of an overall 
preparedness strategy.27  
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, grants and protective status began to 
flow to soft targets of great vulnerability, including religious institutions. Important 
landmarks, whether public, private, or religious, were now labeled critical infrastructure 
under the Homeland Security Presidential Security Directive 7 in 2003.28 In 2005, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began providing grants to nonprofits 
through a specific program known as the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, with a total 
appropriation of $60 million.29 Nonprofits vulnerable to terrorist attacks win grant awards 
to assist them in creating protective barriers.30 Religious organizations are eligible for 
these grants and actively seek them.31 Others have also argued that religious sites should 
be considered critical infrastructure.32 Roadblocks to federal assistance for houses of 
worship have been reduced under the banner of emergency preparedness, but Presidential 
Policy Directive 21 in 2013 eliminated the national monuments and icons sector from the 
list of critical infrastructure sectors, which included religious monuments.33 The 
movement of important religious landmarks in and out of the realm of critical 
infrastructure signals the changing belief structures within the government and it’s 
perception of threats to symbolic structures.  
                                                 
27 Michael L. Crockett, “Federal Role in the Security of Religious Venues in America” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 29, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2889. 
28 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,” Department of Homeland Security, June 27, 2008, 
https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7. 
29 Crockett, “Federal Role in the Security of Religious Venues in America,” 30; “Nonprofit Security 
Grant Program,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed January 24, 2019, 
https://www.fema.gov/nonprofit-security-grant-program; Jewish Community Relations Council, Nonprofit 
Security Grant Program Updates (New York: Jewish Community Relations Council, 2019), 
https://www.jcrcny.org/security-landing/. 
30 “FY 2018 Nonprofit Security Grant Program Fact Sheet,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2018, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/164429. 
31 Jewish Community Relations Council, Nonprofit Security Grant Program Updates. 
32 Crockett, “Federal Role in the Security of Religious Venues in America,” 29. 
33 Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” 
White House, February 12, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/
presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
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2. Soft Target Mitigation Theory 
A growing field of research involves the development of strategies to “harden” 
soft targets. In looking for targets to select, terrorists, as rational actors, will choose a 
target that inspires the greatest fear and spreads their message.34 The softer the target, the 
greater effect is a cornerstone of the terrorist attack strategy. The basic concept behind 
attempting to thwart terrorist actions against an unaware populace is known as a 
deterrence strategy. 
The theory behind deterrence strategy contains two elements, “(1) a threat or 
action designed to increase an adversary’s perceived costs of engaging in particular 
behavior, and (2) an implicit or explicit offer of an alternative state of affairs if the 
adversary refrains from that behavior.”35 The action of hardening a target will increase 
the perceived cost to terrorist actors, which causes them to make the rational decision not 
to attack the target. Deterrence by denial involves taking soft targets and making them 
too difficult to attack without excessive costs and planning.36 Johnson, Mueller, and Taft 
segment the idea into strategic and tactical deterrence, with tactical deterrence applying 
to soft targets as a way to prevent actions of an adversary.37 Tactical deterrence has often 
been seen militarily as stockpiling nuclear weapons or amassing troops, but not as a 
function of boots on the ground, but more the concept of having a ferocious dog guarding 
private property.38 The desired effect is to deter any wrong doers from entering your 
property tactically, not to prevent wrongdoing.39 
                                                 
34 Asal et al., “The Softest of Targets,” 260. 
35 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 90, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.87. 
36 Trager and Zagorcheva, 91. 
37 David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, Conventional Coercion across the 
Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 12, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1494.html. 
38 Gary Hendell, “Deterrence Is Not a Tactical Task,” Modern War Institute at West Point, October 11, 
2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/deterrence-not-tactical-task/. 
39 Paul K. Davis, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 40. 
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Common themes and tactics appear within deterrence strategies to “harden” soft 
spaces. Closed-circuit television, observations of multiple visits by single individuals, 
intelligence sharing, and encouraging people to report suspicious behavior are all 
common tactics.40 The “If you see something, say something” DHS campaign is 
widespread.41 Coaffee et al. argue that targets can be hardened simply by the design of 
the public structure, which make it less likely to be attacked and more resilient from 
damage if such an attack occurs.42 Similarly, Linda Jashari argues that protective design 
elements can be appealing and aesthetically pleasing and that the correct environmental 
design can lessen risk and reduce costs.43 Insurers are also looking into terrorist modeling 
and building owners’ security plans to manage risk, which pushes organizations to harden 
targets to reduce insurance costs.44 Deterrence in soft spaces generally tends to be a 
visual cue that efforts have been made to prevent attacks and “hardening” the religious 
space creates a look and feel counter to what most organizations are trying to create. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Using an Appreciative Inquiry Model, this thesis seeks to develop a portfolio that 
homeland security experts can use to assist in the development and implementation of 
security plans in houses of worship.45 The Appreciative Inquiry Model has five steps: 
define, discover, dream, design, and deliver.46  
                                                 
40 Moeller, “Why Soft Target Terrorist Attacks Will Remain a Threat”; Clarke and Serena, “How to 
Harden America’s Soft Targets.” 
41 “If You See Something, Say Something®,” Department of Homeland Security, December 10, 2014, 
https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something. 
42 Jon Coaffee et al., “Resilient Design for Community Safety and Terror-Resistant Cities,” 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Municipal Engineers 161, no. 2 (2008), 106, 
https://doi.org/10.1680/muen.2008.161.2.103.  
43 Linda Jashari, “Soft Target Security: Environmental Design and the Deterrence of Terrorist Attacks 
on Soft Targets in Aviation Transportation” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 139–41, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58317. 
44 Jared Wade, “The Soft Target,” Risk Management, 2008, 35. 
45 “5-D Cycle of Appreciative Inquiry,” The Appreciative Inquiry Commons (blog), accessed 
September 23, 2018, https://appreciativeinquiry.champlain.edu/learn/appreciative-inquiry-introduction/5-d-
cycle-appreciative-inquiry/. 
46 The Appreciative Inquiry Commons (blog). 
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The first step exactly defines the scope of the thesis as it relates to securing 
religious spaces: soft space protection strategies that will best fit in the religious space. 
The discovery phase researches three distinct areas of soft space security: current 
programs utilized by houses of worship, government programs to assist religious 
organizations, and commercially offered programs for houses of worship. Within the 
discovery phase, the research focuses on operation plans, strategies, guides, and reference 
material that have been published for or implemented by various religious organizations.  
Once a large data set of strategies and plans is unearthed, the next phase analyzes 
what works best and attempts to envision the best possible plans for houses of worship. 
Within the design phase, I will be working within my church, Northminster Presbyterian 
Church, to develop a security plan. The goal is to extract the best strategies and research 
from the discovery phase, and then apply it to a real-world scenario, a faith-based 
organization that has no security plan. The security plan will be created using the Guide 
for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship 
published by FEMA as a framework to build an emergency operations plan.47 As the plan 
for this specific site is developed and augmented from ideas developed in the discovery 
phase, a ground up emergency operations plan will be delivered. 
In delivering an emergency operations plan within a microcosm of one venue, 
many valuable lessons can be applied to other faith-based organizations. Value is 
intrinsic in the planning process and in understanding how a small team works together to 
overcome issues while collaborating. Within intradistrict emergency planning teams, a 
major hurdle is agreement on a mission while sharing a common vernacular, and the 
spiritual side and the security side of a faith-based collaboration while planning a security 
strategy may have the same problem.48 Conflicts between the goals of a religious order— 
for example, open doors and an open campus—will also collide with those more 
concerned with security than access. With limited resources available, faith-based 
                                                 
47 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship. 
48 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Planning, Independent Study 235.b 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 2.11, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/
is235b/is235b.pdf. 
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organizations also must look for cost effective solutions that also meet their goals. A 
belief in an all hazards approach is the norm for emergency planning, yet the soft target 
of a house of worship may not have the available resources, time, energy, or desire to 
mitigate all factors.49 The delivery of a security plan for one site is an attempt to flesh out 
problems commonly found when faith-based organizations attempt security planning and 
devise solutions applicable to other organizations. Solutions and lessons learned from the 
delivery of a security plan for a mediaum sized faith-based campus can be applied to 
other organizations struggling to create a plan of their own. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Following this introduction, Chapter II addresses the state of security in houses of 
worship. Chapter II discusses the various threats to faith-based organizations and the 
challenges unique to soft target security in the religious space. Chapter III is a review of 
materials available to religious organizations within the security landscape. The chapter 
explores commercially available products, internal religious plans, and the federal 
assistance offered. Chapter IV is an exploration of security planning within one 
institution, Northminster Presbyterian Church, as it develops an emergency operations 
plan and how the lessons learned by one religious order can be applied to other faith-
based organizations. The final chapter provides a review of key findings, 
recommendations, and the areas of additional research. 
 
                                                 
49 “Planning,” Ready, accessed October 30, 2019, https://www.ready.gov/planning. 
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II. CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY IN HOUSES OF WORSHIP 
A cursory search of criminal activity that occurs on religious property finds 
thousands of hits for events ranging from vandalism to mass shootings. Federal law 
prohibits intentional damage or destruction of religious real property and intentional 
obstruction by threat or force of a person’s free exercise of religious beliefs.50 Still, the 
pull to injure or interfere with people engaged in religious activity is strong. Religiously 
biased hate crimes, of which 1,542 were reported in 2017, occur at a frequency of about 
15 percent on the campus of a religious order.51 Carl Chinn has been tracking violent 
events on the campuses of faith-based organizations, and logged a total of 118 deaths on 
the grounds of a house of worship in 2017.52 The U.S. Secret Service report on Mass 
Attacks in Public Spaces notes that three attacks occurred on houses of worship in the last 
two years where at least three people were injured.53 These attacks account for roughly 6 
percent of all public space attacks, with the most common being in places of business. A 
more historical study completed by the Center for Homicide Research, which compiled a 
list of shootings at houses of worship from 1980 to 2005, found that 88.5 percent of 
shootings had less than three victims.54 Lesser events will occur and be unreported in 
even local newspapers while the most violent events will get massive media play and 
response from local and national politicians.55 Religious spaces are vulnerable and the 
                                                 
50 “18 U.S. Code § 247—Damage to Religious Property; Obstruction of Persons in the Free Exercise of 
Religious Beliefs,” Legal Information Institute, accessed June 18, 2019, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/text/18/247. 
51 “Incidents and Offenses,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed October 30, 2019, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses. 
52 Carl Chinn, “Deadly Force Incidents at Faith-Based Organizations in the U.S.,” Faith Based Security 
Network Inc., March 19, 2019, http://carlchinn.com/deadly-force-statistics.html. 
53 Lina Alathari et al., Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2018 (Washington, DC: National Threat 
Assessment Center, United States Secret Service, 2019), 3, https://www.secretservice.gov/data/
press/reports/USSS_FY2019_MAPS.pdf.  
54 Derek Bixby, Amy Kielmeyer, and Dallas Drake, United States National Church Shooting 
Database, 1980–2005: Version 1 (Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, 2010), 9, https://doi.org/10.3886/icpsr25561.v1. 
55 Christopher P. Scheitle, “Crimes Occurring at Places of Worship: An Analysis of 2012 Newspaper 
Reports,” International Review of Victimology 22, no. 1 (2016): 67, 73, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0269758015610855. 
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symbolic nature of acts against a house of worship makes them a prime target for various 
criminal and terrorist actors. In combination with the threat is the lack of preparedness 
that houses of worship face as their strained resources and unique hurdles set up 
roadblocks that prevent the majority of religious institutions from having a plan at all.56 
A. THREATS TO THE RELIGIOUS SPACE 
As most currently active terrorist organizations are linked to some type of 
religious belief system, they invariably will have a penchant to attack the religious 
organizations of their perceived enemies.57 It can be seen around the globe from the 
destruction of religious artifacts, tombs, houses of worship, the burning of primarily 
minority churches in the southern United States, to the loss of life from kidnappings and 
beheadings in developing nations. The crimes that lie underneath the headlines are just as 
disturbing. As houses of worship look at external threats, there is more to worry about 
than terrorism, as the risk of theft and violence from within is all the more likely. To 
compound the issue, faith-based organizations have unique challenges that other soft 
targets do not tend to struggle with, for example, domestic violence among congregants 
spilling over into the sanctuary. The threats, seen and unseen, create a unique landscape 
that necessitates a delicately manicured response.  
1. International Terrorist Organizations 
The biggest fear and most unlikely event to occur on a religious space in the 
United States is an attack by the ISIS. An ISIS supporting Syrian refugee was plotting to 
attack a Christian Church in Pittsburgh.58 His motivation may have been a response to the 
2018 killing of Shiite protesters by the Nigerian military, so his target was the Legacy 
International Worship Center, as that congregation has a large Nigerian population.59 
                                                 
56 Sheepdog Church Security, “Church Security Assessment.” 
57 “Institute for Global Change,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, accessed June 19, 2019, 
https://institute.global/. 
58 Julia Reinstein, “The FBI Arrested an Isis Supporter Who Was Allegedly Planning to Bomb a 
Church,” BuzzFeed News, June 20, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/isis-syrian-
refugee-bomb-pittsburgh-fbi-arrested. 
59 Abraham Achirga, “Nigeria Military Opens Fire on Shi’ite Muslim Protesters,” Reuters, October 29, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKCN1N321S. 
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Although the threat to houses of worship from international terrorist organizations is very 
real within the United States, the vast majority of attacks are limited to developing 
countries.60 
The real or perceived threat of terrorist violence against religious institutions is a 
motivating factor in the creation of security plans. Regardless of political or religious 
affiliation, polls indicate that the majority of Americans believe that Muslim Americans 
experience prejudice.61 This prejudice toward Muslim Americans carries with it the belief 
that Muslims, including those in the United States, are potential terrorists.62 Whether the 
source is the perception of risk of an attack on a religious institution, terrorist activity has 
emboldened faith-based organizations to plan for the possible.  
2. Homegrown Terrorism 
Plots against worshippers have occurred with some frequency in the United 
States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently arrested a young man in the 
San Francisco Bay area who was planning to attack a synagogue with an assault rifle that 
he had built at his home.63 Authorities stated that the shootings at a synagogue in Poway, 
California, and the massacre at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand were part of his 
inspiration.64  
The biggest focus, based on the daily news cycle, regarding attacks on religious 
organizations are attacks focused on those of the Jewish faith. The Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL) has been tracking anti-Semitic crimes since the 1970s and noted that 2018 
                                                 
60 “Reports on International Terrorism: Statistics on Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide,” Jewish 
Virtual Library, accessed October 6, 2019, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/statistics-on-incidents-of-
terrorism-worldwide. 
61 “Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” Gallup, accessed October 6, 
2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx. 
62 “Bias against Muslims,” Hate Crime Reporting, accessed October 6, 2019, 
http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-hate-crime/bias-against-muslims. 
63 Gillian Edevane, “California Police Find Nazi Literature, AR-15 in Home of Man Who Allegedly 
Plotted to Murder Jews,” Newsweek, June 15, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/california-police-find-
nazi-literature-ar-15-home-man-who-allegedly-plotted-murder-jews-1444194. 
64 Cheryl Hurd, “Concord Massacre Plot Foiled,” NBC Bay Area, June 14, 2019, 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Concord-Massacre-Plot-Foiled-511341082.html. 
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marked the third-highest number of assaults on Jews and Jewish institutions since the 
ADL began keeping such statistics.65 The year 2018 also witnessed the deadliest incident 
on record, the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 
attacker posted multiple anti-Semitic rants on Gab, a social media site, and his anti-
Semitic beliefs may have been the motivation for the shooting.66 The Poway, California, 
incident was similar; the attacker opened fire at the Chabad of Poway Synagogue to 
“defend my country nation against the Jewish people” and posted a manifesto on 8chan 
that was eerily similar to the manifesto posted by the Christchurch killer.67 Even though 
the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand targeted mosques and the attacks in the United 
States were against synagogues, the similar white nationalist beliefs are a clear 
motivation for the terrorist activity.  
The majority of lower-profile anti-Semitic incidents involve harassment and 
vandalism, accounting for 1967 of the 1986 incidents in 2017.68 Incidents within this 
category include robocalls, campaigns placing fliers on cars at houses of worship and 
homes, and online harassment, almost exclusively by white-supremacist hate groups.69 
White supremacists have also targeted other denominations and their followers. 
Recent events in the United States have elevated this particular group to its list of priority 
                                                 
65 “Anti-Semitic Incidents Remained at Near-Historic Levels in 2018; Assaults against Jews More 
Than Doubled,” Anti-Defamation League, April 30, 2019, https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/anti-
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66 Campbell Robertson, Christopher Mele, and Sabrina Tavernise, “11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; 
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67 Erika Cervantes, “Suspect Said Synagogue Shooting Was to ‘Defend Country,’ Unsealed Search 
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69 Ibrahim Hooper, “CAIR Welcomes Stepped-Up Security after Online Threat Targeting Maryland 
Mosque,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, March 22, 2019, https://www.cair.com/
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terrorist threats against the nation.70 In the 1920s heyday of the Ku Klux Klan, Klansmen 
burned Catholic churches along with the various intimidation tactics used against a 
variety of non-Protestant religious organizations.71 In 2015, the Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church was specifically targeted because it was the oldest black 
church in the south and the assailant assumed that no white people would be in 
attendance.72 Although the attacker was not motivated specifically by hatred of a 
particular religious organization, the vulnerability of the campus, and the makeup of its 
members made it a prime target. In 2012, a neo-Nazi attacked a Sikh Temple in Oak 
Creek, Wisconsin, killing six people.73 Various attacks on religious groups by white 
supremacists have been on the rise around the globe as well, noting that this increase is 
not just an American phenomenon. 
Politically and personally motivated attacks have also caused carnage within the 
walls of religious organizations. In 2009, George Tiller was killed while handing out 
bulletins inside his church because he was a later-term abortion provider, according to 
statements made by the assailant.74 A Herndon, Virginia, man opened fire in 2012 inside 
the Family Research Council, a lobbying group for conservative Christian values, based 
on the organization’s opposition to gay marriage.75 In Antioch, Tennessee, the Burnette 
Chapel Church of Christ was attacked by an assailant who was motivated to kill white 
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churchgoers, based on a note left on his car, in retaliation for the attack on the Charleston, 
South Carolina church by a white supremacist teen in 2015.76 The worst attack on an 
American religious site occurred in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on November 5, 2017, 
when an assailant was reportedly angry with his mother-in-law who attended the church. 
The mother-in-law was not attending services that day and 26 people were murdered.77 In 
sum, religious facilities are a target for those attempting to make a statement, whether it 
is political or religious in nature. 
3. Religiously Motivated Violence 
Personal religious beliefs are also a driving force in violence against houses of 
worship. A small few in the Christian Church feel that attacks on their faith are not taken 
as seriously as those on other faiths. Gerard Batten, the leader of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), when speaking about the Christchurch shootings, states that 
it is “not because the World thinks [Christians] matter less but because the World does 
not fear them, as it does the ‘religion of peace.’”78 The UKIP party has gained far right 
prominence with its attacks on what it calls the “Islamification” of Europe.79 This sense 
of becoming a second-class citizen of the world has become an impetus for attacks by 
white supremacists, including the Christchurch shooter who may have contributed a 
donation to the Identitarian Movement of Austria, which is a counterpart to UKIP.80 The 
attacks on the Christchurch mosques were perpetrated by a devoted white supremacist 
who had a Christian historical perspective that intertwined the view of Christianity with 
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white nationalism.81 The identification with Christian white nationalists and their in-
group narrative is an impetus for attacks, even if the political and religious leaders are 
condemning such acts.  
A string of homegrown terrorist activity has also been inspired by allegiance to 
radical Muslim ideologies. A Long Beach, California, resident, inspired by ISIS, 
considered attacking houses of worship before being apprehended.82 Recently, authorities 
arrested an Ohio man and seized two AR-15 rifles in his possession based on information 
that he was planning to attack a synagogue in the Toledo area out of allegiance to ISIS. A 
plot to bomb the Riverdale Jewish Community Center was foiled by authorities and four 
converts to Islam were convicted and sentenced to life in prison for their role.83 In 2006, 
a man who stated, “I am a Muslim American, angry at Israel,” shot six women at the 
Jewish Federation building in Seattle.84 These examples demonstrate a string of plots and 
incidents in which those swearing allegiance to one faith attacked or planned to attack 
others based solely on their faith. 
4. Other Threats 
The majority of criminal activity on religious properties within the United States 
does not result in the loss of life. Worldwide, the most attention is given to deaths on holy 
ground, but criminal activity on the campuses of religious organizations is daily. 
Domestic disturbances often spill over onto the campuses of the family’s religious 
organization. More than 542 reported instances of domestic violence have led to deadly 
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force incidents on the campus of a religious organization in the last 18 years.85 As 
religious organizations are seen as easy targets, theft is also common. Vandalism, 
especially by young people, is seen quite frequently. The most devastating acts involve a 
higher level of vandalism, arson and its destructive force. 
The specter of domestic violence seems to pervade religious organizations as they 
grapple with the definition of submission and authority over the home.86 Taking 
advantage of a perceived license of total dominion over the home, domestic violence is 
just as common in a religious home as a home of no faith.87 The difference is that 
violence in the homes of religious practitioners has spilled into the house of worship.88 
Domestic violence is an internal threat that faith-based organizations can have a hand in 
mitigating, if they so choose, where other threats that houses of worship have less control 
over can be just as devastating. 
Attacks against the sacred are neither always personal nor spiritually motivated. 
Religious sites are often left unguarded, vacant most of the time, and open to the public. 
The Church of England saw a total loss of 4.5 million pounds from theft in 2010–2011.89 
Church security analysts reported an increase of 50 percent in church theft from 2011 to 
2012. In the last three years, 445 crimes of criminal damage have occurred toward 
religious institutions in Northern Ireland.90 Breaking and entering into the properties of 
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faith-based organizations is low risk for the perpetrator, as religious sites generally do not 
have enhanced protections. Others perceive houses of worship as wealthy and able to 
incur the loss, and that even if caught, the beliefs that congregations hold will forgive. 
After more than 20 burglaries of local houses of worship in Barbour County, Alabama, 
the religious communities’ shock prompted religious organizations to begin installing 
cameras and take additional security precautions even after the culprits were 
apprehended.91 Violence in these instances is rare but can occur, and the most egregious 
example was the 1991 killing of nine people at a Buddhist temple in Waddell, Arizona 
during an armed robbery.92 
The most expensive threat to the physical property of a religious site is fire, 
accidental or intentional. The Poway Synagogue shooter also claimed on 8chan to have 
set fire to a mosque.93 Church burnings in France have become epidemic with no sense of 
what is causing them.94 The executive director of the Observatory of Intolerance and 
Discrimination against Christians in Europe suspects a rise in anti-Christian violence is 
the cause of an increase in arson, as the attacks appear to target sacred symbols.95 A 
common intimidation tactic by extremist in the United States has been the burning of the 
cross on the religious space itself. A spate of church burnings in Louisiana in March and 
April were attributed to a subject with interest in anti-church propaganda.96 About five 
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acts of arson occur a week on religious sites, and three of these have caused significant 
damage to the site.97  
In sum, faith-based organizations are faced with old and new threats coming from 
international and domestic players and a host of thieves looking for easy targets online 
and in the physical space. Such a cacophony of threats, real and perceived, increases the 
desire for threat mitigation planning in houses of worship. Homegrown terrorism has 
increased the pressure within the federal government to reach out to faith-based 
organizations to help prepare for and guard against potential threats. 
B. CHALLENGES IN HARDENING HOUSES OF WORSHIP 
Soft targets are difficult to protect from attack and the nature of houses of worship 
presents a unique difficulty for security planning. Not only are the threats to houses of 
worship real, protecting soft targets against the threat of attack is really challenging. 
Houses of worship are especially vulnerable, as they have a unique set of challenges 
facing their specific type of campus. Faith-based organizations have a structure and ethos 
to be open and inviting, which makes them more susceptible to attack. What little funding 
that may exist for threat mitigation is pulled in multiple directions and managing risk is a 
construct that faith-based organizations struggle to control. In the eyes of an opportunistic 
thief, the potential for exploitation certainly exists. The DHS has outlined some of the 
common vulnerabilities that houses of worship face, for example, easy access.98 
Ultimately, the difficulty is in determining if the time, energy and money is being 
projected in the right direction, which is systemic for all soft targets. 
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1. Risk Management 
What is the size of the house of worship and what is the need? Defining the need 
can be accomplished through understanding and utilizing risk management, which for 
businesses is “a process that allows individual risk events and overall risk to be 
understood and managed proactively, optimising success by minimising threats and 
maximising opportunities.”99 The larger the resources, the more likely the houses of 
worship seem to have taken an active role in risk management. An armed guard at New 
Life Church, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, stopped an active assailant after he killed 
two people in the parking lot as he entered the sanctuary with enough ammunition to kill 
hundreds more.100 New Life has 20 armed safety team members—not enough to stop all 
deaths, but they did prevent a mass tragedy.101 The average house of worship does not 
have such resources and the question becomes how best to use the resources available. To 
maximize capabilities, FBOs can look to risk management strategies and security audits. 
Risk management is a fledgling concept, particularly in the world of nonprofits 
and houses of worship, where institutions and organizations are accustomed to taking 
risks but not necessarily to managing them.102 For a house of worship, risk management 
is the “intentional effort to minimize the effect of conflict on God’s creation.”103 Houses 
of worship generally tend to look at risk management through having comprehensive 
insurance for protection, but not necessarily looking at mitigation.104 Nonprofit 
organizations are unlikely to understand the need for risk management and a common 
idea among religious leaders is that divine intervention would prevent a tragedy from 
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happening.105 Insurance companies are the primary drivers for risk management. They 
are attempting to change the dynamic of static risk management in houses of worship by 
awarding facilities for their safety programs.106  
Performing a risk review is an initial step in knowing what is needed to lessen the 
impact of catastrophic events on a house of worship.107 After reviewing the most 
impactful or costly negative outcomes, houses of worship can then assess how to treat the 
risk identified. The next step is how to treat the defined risk through risk transfer, risk 
avoidance, risk retention, or risk control.108 Risk transfer is the most common tactic used 
by houses of worship, as it involves insurance, which is required by most religious 
organizations for membership.109 Risk avoidance is the concept of not entering into an 
activity and therefore minimizing the risk to the organization.110 Faith-based 
organizations can avoid risk by limiting who is allowed to use and rent their space. Risk 
retention is taking the responsibility for losses on the organization without protection, 
which can come in the form of lowered premiums for a house of worship in exchange for 
extensive risk management procedures.111 Controlling risk is done through minimizing 
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exposure or abandoning activities considered too risky.112 Scheduling maintenance is a 
common way to control risk.113 Once risks are identified, a determination is made on how 
to manage those risks, and a comprehensive plan is then created and implemented.114  
A common belief is that managing risk for a house of worship means closing the 
doors to the people they are trying to reach.115 In fact, managing risk is attempting to 
avoid adverse outcomes, deciding on which ways an organization will handle the risk, 
and allowing for flexible decision making within the context of an FBO’s unique 
space.116 By identifying the risks and analyzing possible negative outcomes, a house of 
worship will have better control over those matters that will hopefully lessen the 
downside of any catastrophic event.117 Individual organizations also encourage utilizing 
risk management tools to prevent unneeded negative press and exposure.118  
Assessing risk is the key to security in a house of worship. The Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) considers assessing vulnerabilities a best practice. 
Mosques are encouraged to assess what vulnerabilities exist, what risks they are facing, 
and look at what is possible given the resources available.119 As suggested in the 
literature from CAIR, the Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) will 
send a protective security advisor to any house of worship that requests it and perform an 
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assist audit.120 Local law enforcement also offers security audits and site surveys for 
houses of worship.121 Individual fellowships also look to assessments as a critical step in 
security planning.122 Assessment of the current state of site security is instrumental in 
discovering the biggest security threats.123 Security needs are then balanced with the 
other risk factors facing a house of worship. 
2. Funding 
Religious institutions face the dilemma of paying for added security in a time of 
tight budgets. The Chai Center, a Chabad synagogue in Dix Hills, New York, estimates 
that the physical security enhancements that they are implementing will cost $150,000.124 
Such expenses are not possible for many houses of worship. As religious institutions 
grapple with a downturn in funding from reduced giving, paying for basic security 
needs—cameras and alarms, for example—seems extravagant.125 Church giving has been 
in decline since the 1960s and so has membership.126 Most houses of worship have fewer 
than 200 parishioners, and 66.8 percent of congregations have fewer than 100 
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attendees.127 Such small bodies struggle to raise and maintain the resources to keep the 
lights on, let alone allocating time and money to plan, prepare, and prevent violence on 
their premises. At the same time, houses of worship feel it is necessary to spend money 
on securing facilities, as the threat of loss of life or property appears to be growing.  
3. Unique Nature of Religious Spaces 
Faith-based organizations have differing views on whether a higher power will 
protect them and the congregation from violence.128 A belief that fate or a predetermined 
outcome is common among the world’s religions.129 With this belief comes the idea that 
a death from an attack by the “enemy” of the faith can help to grow the faith. According 
to the Pastor of First Baptist Church of Sutherland Springs, Frank Pomeroy, those who 
died are now martyrs and the growth of the church is a result of their sacrifice.130 
Acquiring followers by making yourself an easy target is not a popular idea, though. 
Within the Christian church, recent catastrophic events in Charleston and Sutherland 
Springs has shifted the opinion of most regarding a need for security but a minority still 
feel investing in security measures is evidence of a lack in trust for God’s plan.131 In 
contrast, synagogues struggle with how much security, but having it is not in question.132  
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Houses of worship are seen as a place of refuge, where the tired, hungry, and 
broken go in times of need. Access to a campus is considered sacrosanct and people trust 
that those on campus are there for help. Believing that people come on the campus of an 
FBO for good reasons does not mean that those on the campus cannot look for threat 
indicators and be on guard.133 As the belief that houses of worship are to be open and 
inviting, the architecture also creates a security concern.  
Simple construction of a religious site can bring resistance from citizens and local 
governments.134 Refugee populations within certain religious orders will have 
experienced religious oppression and that fear of the government will not simply 
disappear.135 Houses of worship with large immigrant populations, legal and illegal, may 
also be reluctant to work with the DHS as it actively shields immigrants from 
deportation.136 Fear of government intrusion and violence toward minority groups pushes 
these same groups away from the assistance offered for security planning, which makes 
them even more vulnerable. 
The lack of knowledge about how to create a security plan, the inability to gather 
resources, and the reticence of houses of worship to request assistance from government 
partners creates hurdles for security planning at faith-based sites. The task itself can be so 
overwhelming and the research needed to sort through all the programs that exist creates 
a bridge too far for some religious leaders. Soft target mitigation literature for houses of 
worship can be filtered into a usable format with the understanding of where the material 
is and how to access it succinctly.  
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III. SOFT-TARGET DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR THE 
RELIGIOUS SPACE 
Shemot in the Torah is the story of the Israelites fleeing the persecution of the 
Pharaoh. Jesus said, “Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, for 
theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”137 The Quran states, “Remember! Moses said to his 
people, “Call to mind the favour of Allah to you when He delivered you from the people 
of Pharaoh: they set you hard tasks and punishments, slaughtered your sons, and let your 
women-folk live: therein was a tremendous trial from your Lord.”138 Religions 
worldwide have faced persecution and death from those who oppose their views. Most 
religions speak of and expect persecution, but instead of accepting persecution and death, 
U.S. religious organizations are taking a more active role in protecting their followers. To 
protect houses of worship, leaders have looked for strategies to assist them in the 
protection of their members.  
Homeland security experts also have contributed to understanding the threats to 
religious spaces and the tactics and strategies necessary to assist in the protection of these 
unique spaces. Indeed, a cottage industry of “ministries,” and commercial providers has 
developed to assist houses of worship in preparing for the hazards that they face. The 
material created by the various organizations involved in this homeland security space is 
robust, complex, and at many times, overwhelming for the lay person attempting to create 
a plan to protect a faith-based organization. 
A. FEDERAL AND STATE ASSISTANCE  
Houses of worship have an almost unending source of material from government 
agencies to assist them with developing plans for their protection. Guides from various 
federal organizations have been created to assist houses of worship in the five stages of 
emergency planning (prevention, protection, mitigation, response, recovery). Assistance 
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at the local level includes audits from federal and local agencies of religious sites to 
review each site’s capabilities. The federal government also monitors and propagates 
information networks to permit the sharing and dissemination of best practices. Direct 
outreach through conferences and public meetings closes the circle for federal support 
toward houses of worship as they attempt to spread the most valuable concepts to 
different religious organizations. Federal and state outreach attempts to assist 
organizations, regardless of religious affiliation, through various outreach campaigns, 
webinars, videos, guides, and exercises. 
1. Guides 
Major resources offered at the federal level assist FBOs in security planning and 
the reference guides produced by various agencies act as the framework for assistance in 
security planning. One such resource is the Guide for Developing High Quality 
Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, which is an all-hazards approach to 
the development of an emergency operations plan (EOP) for a specific site. The resource 
is an essential first step into the development of an EOP and even provides specifics on 
how to develop an evacuation plan. The guide is available through the FEMA “Resources 
to Protect Houses of Worship” website, which is a clearinghouse for all things related to 
the protection of religious sites.139 The guide walks a faith-based organization through 
the planning process to the creation of an emergency operations plan and gives the basic 
content that a general security plan should have.  
Within the framework of an EOP, FEMA outlines several key components. A 
major focus is placed on how to create what is termed “functional annexes” around 
evacuations, lockdowns, and shelter-in-place action plans.140 Another section of the guide 
gives greater insight into active shooter scenarios and what is needed for congregations to 
prepare, prevent, respond, and recover from a possible attack.141 As with many guides, it 
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is essential to understand the function and focus, as this guide is written for the specific 
creation of an operations plan. In looking for other such essential elements beyond an 
evacuation plan as threat and hazard identification (although it is mentioned in the 
document), a house of worship would need to go elsewhere.  
Less specific to houses of worship, but just as valuable, is a resource guide 
developed by CISA. Its Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places Resource Guide 
was last updated in April 2019.142 This guide is a jumping off point for homeland security 
practitioners of every persuasion to gain basic knowledge about the threats present, how 
to identify suspicious behavior, what to do prior to and during an active assailant, and 
prevention and response to bombings. Outlined with annotations to the target audience of 
each resource, those concerned with FBO security can move directly to the areas of 
greatest interest to their congregation. Of particular interest are the sections on 
identifying suspicious behavior and the preparation and response to active assailants, two 
areas where houses of worship have historically had the least experience.143  
Within the material on the identification of suspicious behavior are various links 
to guides and materials, with brief descriptions, and most notably, action guides on how 
to identify and mitigate those on the path to violence.144 Within the links to preparing and 
responding to active assailants, multiple action guides relate to different types of possible 
attacks.145 Each guide links to a two-page resource for that particular type of attack that 
outlines protective measures, what to do in case of an attack, and reminders on ways to be 
alert.146 For those needing more information, a list of links and contacts is provided. As 
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stated by the Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security, a division of CISA, the guide 
is a tool for those attending houses of worship, or other mass gatherings, to raise 
awareness and assist in the mitigation of those threats.147 
Government repositories have a deep expertise that focuses on assisting 
government agencies in understanding the abilities and needs of religious organizations 
in their area. FEMA has also provided guides to help agencies engage with religious 
organizations before, after, and during disasters so that organizations will consider their 
unique needs and perspectives.148 Tip sheets have been created to outline the religious 
and cultural issues that particular organizations may have and the products have been 
developed with the assistance of religious and cultural leaders.149 If a homeland security 
operator needed to assist a Sikh fellowship with a security plan, for example, the tip sheet 
would be a good tool to give an agent an understanding of the cultural norms of this 
particular group. Agencies have given the tools to understand the social construct that 
religious organizations live in, which in turn can help agents build unique strategies 
tailored to the needs of individual belief systems, such as using security cameras to assist 
in monitoring the campus of the faith-based organization that also can benefit those who 
are homebound by linking the system to a broadcast over the internet. 
Guides presented by FEMA and CISA are a great starting point to assist in the 
planning and preparation of emergency action plans, but they lack clarity and structure 
needed to complete the process. As the government takes an all-hazards approach, the 
amount of information grows into seemingly infinite amounts. Such a large amount of 
information becomes burdensome for local congregations, as leaders have to wade 
through various guides to look for what they may need. Ultimately, it creates a barrier to 
effective assistance without more direction. Government agencies, though, do not simply 
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create guides in a vacuum. Agencies have developed numerous ways to promote and 
assist FBOs with not only understanding their guides for protecting houses of worship, 
but they will also help build guides through audits and exercises. 
2. Audits and Exercises 
Implementing a plan, practicing a security plan, and identifying the major risks to 
a house of worship is also instrumental. Agencies not only provide guides to develop 
security plans, they will also work with individual sites through audits and exercises to 
help enhance planning and evolve security plans. Opportunities are available to 
participate in tabletop exercises with first responders through FEMA and CISA. CISA is 
also available to perform informal and formal site audits through assist visits.150  
CISA offers different avenues for face-to-face contact with their protective 
security advisors (PSA) and other operators.151 PSAs work with other DHS components 
to advise private sector facilities on infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation 
through local field activities.152 Critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments are the 
field activities that CISA uses to identify critical infrastructure needs.153 Within the 
assessments offered, assist visits are of particular interest to religious organizations, as 
they can be tooled to provide the information that houses of worship must develop the 
proper plans, as well as be an opportunity to have an expert assess the vulnerability of the 
particular property.154 Although mainly focused on large-scale operations, for example 
malls and convention centers, advisors are able to tailor visits.  
A step further in the process is the Infrastructure Survey Tool, a survey that 
assists in identifying the security strength of a site.155 A final step that CISA offers is the 
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Emergency Services Specific Tabletop Exercise Program, a discussion-based exercise led 
by PSAs to conduct workshops on possible scenarios and identify critical faults in prior 
plans.156 Information regarding the program is rather vague but each tabletop exercise is 
tailored to the specific infrastructure division and is designed to incorporate a large 
number of participants, which makes it an unlikely resource for an individual property 
unless it is involved in a larger exercise. 
FEMA is much more involved in the creation and implementation of exercises for 
houses of worship than other elements of DHS. The most dynamic tool FEMA has 
created is the Preparedness Toolkit. Individual organizations can register and gain access 
to the entire cadre of preparedness planning available, which includes developing 
exercises to check for capability and discover gaps.157 The Emergency Management 
Institute can be contacted to develop an exercise for stakeholders tied to a faith-based 
community and provides these organizations the opportunity to join a planned exercise 
through its portal.158 Within the Institute, individuals can also receive free training 
through their Independent Study Program at https://training.fema.gov/is/.159 Courses are 
available to prepare for active shooters, surveillance awareness, and community 
preparedness, to name a few.160 Exercises and independent studies give FBOs an 
opportunity to work through campus security techniques that may be applicable to their 
location while leveraging the expertise of government officials.  
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3. Information Networks, Campaigns, and Webinars 
FEMA has developed a series of webinars targeted at houses of worship to assist 
in the creation of nationally aligned EOPs, as well as education in specialized areas. 
Through its main site, and in Ready.gov, FEMA has built in various webinars to outline 
the value that houses of worship play in disasters and how to prevent a disaster on their 
own campuses.161 FEMA has developed such webinars as IS-360: Preparing for Mass 
Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship, 
which covers the “key considerations and strategies for preparing for mass casualty 
incident.”162 The limits of this webinar is similar to other guides in that it provides 
general information only without addressing such specific considerations of houses of 
worship as the need to balance the desire to keep doors open during services to create a 
welcoming environment and the need to protect those in attendance. Specialized videos 
for specific events are also available to the general public, for example how to respond to 
a bomb threat.163 The general presupposition of most webinars is that houses of worship 
and educational settings have very similar needs and operations, which is true, but the 
subtle differences between these two settings are important.  
A FEMA webinar housed on the Readiness and Emergency Management for 
Schools Technical Assistance Center website titled, “An Overview of the Guide for 
Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship,” is a 
companion to the guide developed by FEMA.164 The webinar walks viewers through the 
planning process to create an EOP and specifically introduces the active shooter portion 
of the planning process.165 Watching the webinar is intended to be done while following 
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the companion guide, “Developing High Quality Emergency Operation Plans for Houses 
of Worship,” which can be found on the link at the site.166 Homeland security 
practitioners with firsthand knowledge from agents who responded to actual acts of 
violence on the campuses of FBOs created this webinar.167  
At the end of the webinar, viewers are encouraged to sign up on the FEMA 
community website.168 Because the webinar is from 2013, and the FEMA website has 
been updated since the creation of the webinar, the links discussed in the webinar have 
changed, for example fema.gov/plan.169 Information discussed in the webinar, such as 
active shooter response, can be found through simple searches on the FEMA and 
Ready.gov websites, however, and it remains practical.   
Faith-based organizations may also receive updated information about evolving 
threats and new strategies for securing their places of worship through the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN).170 The purpose of the HSIN is a trusted share site 
for partners in the homeland security apparatus allowing for the sharing of best practices 
across the network based on subsets including critical infrastructure.171 Within the critical 
infrastructure node is a share point for faith-based organizations to have two-way 
communication with other concerned organizations and homeland security experts.172 
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The site is protected by a password and all members must be screened and are provided 
an invitation by the requested community of interest (COI).173  
Once approved to a COI, access to all posts is generated by anyone in that 
workgroup. This type of approval gives FBOs an opportunity to share with other religious 
facilities and experts in the field of security management behind a secure site, as some of 
the information is considered sensitive. A major hurdle is that each COI is run 
independently and the HSIN has little control over each community of interest so when 
an issue arises, the help desk can only refer the matter to the facilitator of the community 
and wait for a response. It has been more than six months since the author requested 
access to the Faith-Based Organizations Community of Interest, and after multiple calls 
and emails, the request still has not been resolved. It is not at all possible to value the 
material within the COI without access.  
Other areas within HSIN have been accessed, and provide valuable resources for 
planners interested in assisting houses of worship. Law enforcement officials have posted 
aides to assist other law enforcement entities with assisting FBOs in the commercial 
facilities node of the HSIN. For example, a tabletop exercise template has been posted to 
assist law enforcement with planning for an active assailant scenario at a house of 
worship.174 All the materials for planning, presenting, and engaging with FBOs is 
available to any member of the HSIN who has access to the commercial facilities node. 
Access to the commercial facilities node is given to law enforcement or those given 
permission by a host organization.175  
FEMA and other entities within the DHS will direct houses of worship to their 
various public information campaigns. “You Are the Help until Help Arrives” is the 
newest campaign rolled out by FEMA in an effort to create action by bystanders at 
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traumatic incidents before emergency services arrives.176 The five steps of the program 
include Call 9-1-1, stay safe, stop the bleeding, position the injured, and provide comfort. 
The concept behind this new campaign is that first responders are on the way, but 
bystanders can also provide lifesaving measures until professionals arrive.177 Web-based 
training and in person training is available, something of value to prepare for many 
hazards that may occur on the campus of a religious organization.178  
The most well-known DHS campaign, “If you see something, say something” 
encourages all to act and the DHS provides training to help people recognize threat 
indicators.179 An integral part of any active assailant defense plan, the DHS stresses, is 
the run, hide, fight doctrine stressed at every level of the government.180 The simple 
strategy is adaptable and can act as the foundation to multiple response strategies.181 The 
familiarity of these programs with the general public are a good start to creating a 
dialogue with local religious groups and can act as a catalyst to planning and response 
better to an emergency on the campus of an FBO.  
4. Public Events  
U.S. Attorney’s Offices have held security summits with local religious leaders 
since 2015. Beginning in Detroit, protecting houses of worship events have been held 
across the country.182 The FBI Office of Partner Engagement engages with religious 
groups to inform them more effectively of threat information that they receive.183 The 
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Department of Justice also offers training to start religious groups of all faiths on the path 
to developing their own security plans.184 The DHS partners with local counties to put on 
“safety and security” evenings to discuss planning, preparedness, and response.185  
As many of the crimes that occur on religious campuses can be labeled hate 
crimes, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties also performs roundtables 
throughout the country.186 FEMA routinely puts on workshops, including those designed 
specifically for active shooter planning.187 Face-to-face events are intended to raise 
awareness and improve relationships with stakeholders in religious organizations. 
B. SELF-HELP 
Activities surrounding emergency planning also are done by individual 
congregations, ad hoc security networks, and by the national fellowships. Networks built 
by organizations assist houses of worship in building plans, prepare constituents for 
possible threats, and organize response teams.188 The development of security teams is a 
spreading phenomenon as houses of worship recognize that the first responders to any 
event will be themselves.189 To organize teams, most congregations have built emergency 
operation plans, action plans, or security plans to memorialize what is supposed to be 
done if an emergency were to occur.  
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1. Religious-based Security Networks 
An instrumental portion of planning and preparing for security on the campus of a 
faith-based organization is the ability to communicate with those in the same faith; not as 
an exclusion to the security of other faiths, but developed to target an audience with 
similar facilities and world views. Multiple faiths have organized themselves to help 
secure those of likeminded organizations. For example, those of the Christian faith have 
multiple networks to connect with to prepare, plan, and recover from an incident. The 
Arizona Church Security Network (AZCSN) was founded in 2017 to provide training and 
opportunities to all faith-based organizations in Arizona.190 The AZCSN provides 
monthly lunch and learn sessions. It held its first conference in September 2019. The 
Faith Based Security Network (FBSN) is another non-denominational, Christian group of 
law enforcement professionals.191 The unique nature of the FBSN is the development of 
single page best practice guides available to members.192 The downside is that the 
information is semipublic, as it is only available to members, which can include anyone 
involved at any level of security in a religious organization.  
Those of the Jewish faith have also developed their own network in preparation of 
any possible attack.193 Some of the most highly publicized attacks in recent years have 
come against members of the Jewish faith in their own synagogues. The Secure 
Community Network (SCN) was founded in 2004 to serve the American Jewish 
community and address all hazards that the community may face.194 SCN has its own 
suite of training nodes and the web site is the premier information-sharing portal for 
faith-based organizations.195 Assistance with grant writing and security planning are just 
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some of the functions that the SCN performs for the Jewish community.196 The DHS has 
partnered with the SCN on multiple occasions, and most recently as CISA ran a joint 
exercise with the SCN regarding incident response.197 As the most robust faith-based 
security organization, the SCN has a far reach, yet it will even admit more is to be 
done.198 
Outside actual religious orders, non-profit networks are also interested in faith-
based security matters. One such organization is the Faith-Based Information Sharing and 
Analysis Organization (FB-ISAO). ISAOs are nationally recognized networks considered 
an integral part of the national strategy by promoting information sharing and distributive 
capabilities.199 FB-ISAO requires membership, which can range from free to $480 a year 
with member access to various traffic light protocols (TLPs) dependent on which 
membership is chosen.200 The ISAO shares threats and reports to members after 
analyzing the information and leveraging the knowledge of its members to focus efforts 
on the most likely threats.201 As their first membership meeting occurred in October 
2019, and they have not completed any workshops or events yet, like many other online 
resources, an FBO must use due diligence before spending constituents’ money.202 
Faith-based security networks provide a valuable asset to individual 
congregations as they look for assistance in securing religious sites. The SCN is allied 
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with the Jewish Federation and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish 
Organizations and every member is encouraged to use them in an official capacity.203 
Multiple denominations are involved in the Arizona Church Security Network, as they 
hold trainings at various and different sites including Protestant and Catholic churches.204 
As these organizations grow to assist more houses of worship, their inherent value 
increases to the religious community.  
2. Faith-based Security Teams 
A seemingly obvious choice for FBOs is to have protective security around the 
perimeter of an event or meeting. Most organizations have greeters or ushers to assist 
those entering the house of worship and an extension may include perimeter security. The 
Council on American-Islamic Relations considers ushers acting as security a best 
practice.205 Such a simple act requires planning and tact, and the balance between 
security and openness is paramount.206 The development of teams can be ad hoc or fully 
formed, based on the individual strategy of the community they serve. An armed 
volunteer on the security team at New Life Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado ended 
an attack on that church in 2007; 12 hours after the subject attacked a defenseless Youth 
with a Mission campus in which he killed two.207 Houses of worship may create teams in 
reaction to a mass shooting or in response to a public event. More organized activities 
would include the development of procedures through a committee or coopting plans 
from national and local models.  
                                                 
203 Michael Masters, “How to Prevent another Pittsburgh,” Jewish News Syndicate, accessed 
November 3, 2019, https://www.jns.org/opinion/how-to-prevent-another-pittsburgh/. 
204 “Training,” Arizona Church Security Network LLC, accessed November 3, 2019, 
https://Arizonachurchsecuritynetwork.com/training/. 
205 Council on American-Islamic Relations, Best Practices for Mosque and Community Safety 
(Washington, DC: Council on American-Islamic Relations, n.d.), 4, accessed October 8, 2019, 
https://www.cairflorida.org/images/CAIR_Mosque_Safety_Best_Practices.pdf. 
206 Timothy Fancher, “3 Most Crucial Needs of a Church Security Team,” Worship Facilities, June 14, 
2018, https://www.worshipfacilities.com/security/3-most-crucial-needs-church-security-team. 
207 Kirk Johnson and Dan Frosch, “Police Tie Colorado Church Shootings to One Gunman,” New York 
Times, December 11, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/us/11churches.html. 
41 
Beyond organization at the individual congregation level, some organizations 
look to community patrols. The Muslim Community Patrol in New York was created to 
provide extra security to Islamic schools and mosques and was partially formed in 
response to the Christchurch massacre.208 Governments also responded after the 
Christchurch massacre with protective details of their own.209 Such a presence in the 
aftermath of a tragedy gives comfort to worshippers. Nassau County in Florida has 
proposed a mandatory law enforcement presence at all houses of worship, with support 
from the religious community.210 Continual presence at religious institutions by law 
enforcement is not a long-term solution and FBOs are more inclined to keep security 
matters internal.211 Security teams are generally volunteer, and take some kind of 
training.212 Armed security is another question with which houses of worship struggle. 
Such a decision will depend on state and local requirements and the beliefs of an 
individual house of worship. As Iman Jodeh of the Colorado Muslim Society says in 
response to armed attendants, “we realize that prayer can’t be our only form of 
defense.”213 
C. COMMERCIAL SPACE 
Myriad agencies and private corporations are willing to step in and assist, and the 
numbers appear to be endless. Searching the internet for “church security” will give 
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523,000,000 results, and the first page mostly provides links to fee for service sites.214 
Not all are costly, and some are catered to a specific religious belief system, such as the 
Sheepdog Seminars; others develop material as part of their overall security services to 
other agencies, and a third group appears to be attempting to make a fast profit from the 
security concerns of faith-based organizations. The difficulty lies in understanding what 
is available that is useful and affordable, especially as some small groups do not have the 
ability to invest in their own defense. 
1. Ministries and Marketing 
The ALICE Training Institute offers the most well recognized and developed 
program available. ALICE (alert, lockdown, inform, counter, evacuate) is a for cost 
training that has seen the greatest success with school emergency planning. It offers a 
specific plan for houses of worship and reduced costs for non-profit organizations.215 
Free webinars and packets to assist in planning are all linked to an overall protection 
package. The institute recently purchased SafePlans, LLC that developed the Emergency 
Response Information Portal, an all-inclusive emergency preparedness solution geared to 
schools that could be used by houses of worship. Certification training costs $695, which 
provides an instructor to teach the congregation and utilize the resources the ALICE 
Institute provides.216 A house of worship with funds to create an immediate impact in 
security planning can look to the ALICE Institute as a one-stop shop. ALICE is 
performing very similar functions that FEMA and CISA operators do, but in a more 
concise and organized manner, just as the concepts ALICE training espouses are parallel 
to what the DHS recommends.  
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Less expensive, but targeted to those of the Christian faith, are the Sheepdog 
Seminars, begun by Dave Grossman. Dave Grossman is known for his international 
training seminars on building resiliency in law enforcement officers and promoting 
school security.217 As an offshoot to his current activities, he has partnered with such 
other experts as Jimmy Meeks and Carl Chinn to deliver the message about the 
importance of building a plan to combat the threats that already exist and may come to 
the door of a service.218 The material is intensely focused on protestant churches and 
ideology and, although the material is valuable, other religious faiths may be 
uncomfortable with the delivery, as it is focused on training “Christian Sheepdogs” to 
defend the Church in Jesus’ name.219 Costs for the seminars held throughout the country 
range from $59 to $99, depending on the place in which it is held, but the organization 
offers other options in an attempt to offer the information to as many groups as 
possible.220 Seminars are not intended to have attendees come back with a plan to 
implement when they return to their house of worship, but with the inspiration to start 
one.  
A more focused approach is to partner with an organization like the Church 
Security Alliance. The Church Security Alliance is a fee-based service that provides a 
variety of security activities and plans ready for immediate use and implementation. They 
offer free planning videos and an assessment; other resources and services are offered for 
a fee.221 Shepherd’s Watch will also provide training. Working in concert with 
Brotherhood Mutual to bring a sense of legitimacy, the Brotherhood Mutual is one of the 
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major insurers of churches and ministries throughout the country.222 On its website, it 
offers webinars and articles to assist in the development of building security plans, at no 
expense.223 Also available is its “Safe and Secure Church” kit, a training guide for 
recruiting, planning, and preparing a security team.224 The cost of the kit, at $249.99, 
would put it out of reach for many smaller congregations.  
Outside the larger, more well-known groups, others have developed trainings and 
guidance to assist houses of worship. Tina Lewis Rowe is a speaker and consultant who 
works with local police departments and FBOs. She has developed a Safety and Security 
guide for houses of worship to use. The guide is a robust 183-page document meant to 
walk a planner through the development of a safety and security team.225 The various 
material in the guide, including a survey tool, are free for use and intended to assist in the 
development of a plan no matter the complexity.226 Rowe offers the opportunity to bring 
her services in to produce a seminar or consult on the development of such plans.227 Jim 
McGuffey, founder of churchsecurityconsultant.com, is an independent security 
consultant who has partnered with various local agencies and faith-based organizations. 
He was also instrumental in the development of Security Risk Assessments for the DHS 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.228  
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Other groups, for example Full Armor Church, Public Safety University, and 
Church Security University, offer all types of assistance. Each of these groups initially 
request funds to view their plans and the Public Safety University website is no longer 
functioning, which raises the question as to what a religious organization may have 
received for its $20 monthly membership. Faith-based organizations have to be cautious, 
as the attempt to find a quick security solution may expose the community to more risk 
rather than minimizing it.  
With the wealth of information available through professionals, religious leaders 
would naturally look to them for assistance. Many treat the need for security as a ministry 
that is not meant to make money and all appear to be looking out for the greater good 
when developing programs. All the programs and material point to the same concept that 
a house of worship must develop a cadre of members who will plan for emergency 
events, implement the plans, and continue the process. Different levels of assistance are 
offered, but the individual congregation must take action. The difficulty is in choosing 
who will provide the “best” product to provide the most safety, within the parameters the 
congregation is comfortable with and can sustain. As trainers would point out, it is an 
individual choice.229 
2. Publicly Available Resources 
The lack of access to participatory resources does not limit the ability of a house 
of worship to protect themselves. Not only have FEMA, CISA, and other federal agencies 
provided resources, individuals and various organizations have also encouraged the use 
of their online documents. Beyond that, a wealth of information can be found by 
searching for articles on how to develop a plan or what it should require. Understanding 
the role of government in the mitigation of threats and emergencies is also valuable, as 
congregations must understand what and who is coming to help in order to prepare 
members of the religious faith to react predictably to first responders who follow specific 
protocols in emergency situations, such as the treating all subjects as potential threats. 
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The National Disaster Interfaith Network, in conjunction with University of 
Southern California Center for Religion and Civic Culture, has created a field guide titled 
Working with U.S. Faith Communities during Crises, Disasters & Public Health 
Emergencies.230 The guide is meant to educate disaster responders to working with 
religious groups and attempting to streamline cooperation. Church Mutual Insurance 
provides a self-inspection program free of charge to help understand gaps in security.231 
Bill Harvey offers multiple security strategies for houses of worship.232 The concepts of 
vulnerability studies, securing the property, and elimination of easy targets within the 
religious site are issues covered. ASIS International, through its Houses of Worship 
Committee, has developed a best practices doctrine that is available as a free resource.233 
Put together by people considered experts in the field of security for FBOs—notably Jim 
McGuffey and Carl Chinn—the nine-page guide walks a leader through the basic needs 
for securing any house of worship. A search for a specific need, for example closed-
circuit television, will also garner plenty of results.  
A massive amount of material is available to the general public. Federal, state, 
local, private, and public sources are widely distributed. People are standing at the ready, 
some for a fee or donation, to help plan for the worst-case scenario. Hundreds of houses 
of worship and their attendees have been trained to act in mass casualty incidents.234 Yet, 
only a minority of houses of worship have any sort of soft target mitigation capability at 
all. Worse yet, many have started and stopped planning, forgetting the lessons that they 
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have already learned and are now having to relearn as turnover forces new leadership to 
wonder what was done before.235  
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IV. NORTHMINSTER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH EMERGENCY 
OPERATIONS PLANNING 
As a real-world exercise, the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, along with the webinar recorded on July 25, 
2013 by the Department of Education in conjunction with FEMA, was used to frame and 
develop a security plan for Northminster Presbyterian Church (NPC).236 Located in 
Tucson, Arizona, NPC is a mid-sized congregation of 959 members with a campus 
consisting of a main sanctuary, a school, multiple outlying buildings, and a personal 
residence. On Sundays, Northminster offers three worship services in English, an Arabic 
language service, and a multilingual African service. During the week, Northminster 
Christian School is operational and the business center is open for appointments and 
visits. Monday nights include a meal service to those in need while on Wednesday nights, 
traditional services and youth outreach programs take place. The diversity of activities is 
intended to offer a rich environment for many different worshippers and also creates a 
much larger target profile if an assailant wishes to harm someone from the refugee or 
Middle Eastern community. In the past, Northminster has experienced threats of violence 
against members of the Middle Eastern fellowship, property theft, and domestic 
disturbances.  
NPC has created security plans, and has one in place. The execution, as with most 
houses of worship, is the major issue for the security plan. To enact a plan fully, NPC 
followed the planning process recommended by FEMA to include forming a 
collaborative team, understanding the situation and identifying threats and hazards 
through a site visit, determining goals and objectives, developing an approved plan, and 
implementing that plan.237  
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A. PRIOR SECURITY PLANNING 
Northminster Presbyterian Church, recognizing the potential issues with security, 
has made multiple attempts to develop a site security plan. The initial impetus was the 
shooting that took place on January 8, 2011 outside a Safeway in Oro Valley, Arizona, in 
which U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords was shot along with 18 others.238 Of the six 
killed in the incident, one was a member of Northminster Presbyterian Church—Phyllis 
Schneck.239 Thus, the incident deeply affected the congregation and out of the tragic 
events, the initial attempt to create a security plan was attempted. 
Initially led by a retired law enforcement officer, the initial attempt at a security 
plan was completed. A safety committee was formed and a safety manual was created. 
The basic tenets of an emergency operation plan—a response framework with specific 
roles for responders—were created. The committee also created shelter in place kits that 
were distributed on the campus of the church. When the creator of the plan moved to 
New Mexico, the plan itself was set aside. 
The work continued when Northminster initiated a disaster preparedness and 
response plan (DPRP) in 2018. Taking a different approach than the initial security plan, 
the DPRP focuses on preparation and response, which is a modification of the five steps 
FEMA outlines in emergency planning of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery.240 Used as a general guideline for any and all incidents, the plan develops 
roles and responsibilities for key actors in the church. Once an incident has occurred, the 
team members are to act in their various roles to assist in the response to an emergency. 
Material in the DPRP is based on the materials provided to Northminster from the 
Presbyterian Disaster Assistance ministry.241 Intended as a living document, the DPRP is 
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to be reviewed and modified as needed. Approved in February 2018, the DPRP has never 
been enacted and has since not been modified. As with many faith-based organizations, 
the plan is simply the beginning and the execution becomes the biggest hurdle.242 
In the belief that something more comprehensive needed to be created, 
Northminster leadership wished to create a comprehensive emergency operations plan 
that specifically memorialized what was to be done during an emergency, specifically the 
steps needed to be taken when an active assailant is on campus. Past instances of active 
assailants on the grounds of Northminster have led people to reflect on the events, which 
created the need to improve the security of the facility. Pastors and church administrators 
have attended trainings and events regarding security planning, but nothing has been 
formalized. The greatest concern is that something will occur and the ill-preparedness of 
the community will cause a greater loss of life.  
As a measure to prepare for action during any possible catastrophic event, 
Northminster created a committee to develop a security plan. The Security Committee 
was tasked with building an EOP and to look at the vulnerabilities of the NPC campus. 
To direct our energies and to follow the planning process outlined by FEMA, NPC 
enlisted the help of PSAs from the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency. 
B. SITE VISIT 
PSAs from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency came to 
Northminster Presbyterian Church to perform what is known as an assist visit. Assist 
visits are an integral part of the CISA outreach mission to inform those running key 
infrastructure facilities (in this case, a commercial soft target space) of CISA’s mission 
and resources available to improve security, preparedness, and resiliency.243 The visit can 
help to note gaps in current plans or to create a foundation to start the creation of a formal 
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security plan. For NPC, the assist visit was for the latter. It pointed out the basics of a 
security plan and the most obvious needs of the physical security of the building. 
Meeting with CISA provided a wealth of knowledge for NPC staff and volunteers 
to learn about the basics of a security plan, as well as how to move forward with 
formalized planning. The most telling matter is the concept of six minutes. PSAs advised 
that the average response time for police in an emergency situation is six minutes and that 
NPC owned those six minutes. “What are you going to do in those six minutes?” is a 
question that must be asked and answered within the plan created. From this discussion 
came the need to inform the congregation of the concept of “run, hide, fight,” the national 
response strategy in the event of an active shooter. To implement an effective response, 
the planning committee must know who among the congregation carry firearms. Anyone 
who plans or is carrying a firearm should be trained through a certified active shooter-
training course. CISA identifies designated security as “active walkers.” The ushers in the 
church are already familiar with those in the congregation, and with training, can best 
identify a possible threat. CISA advisors informed those in the meeting how to identify 
atypical behaviors and red flags to watch out for. A formal written plan based on a site 
survey of needs is the best way to identify gaps and areas for improvements for any house 
of worship. 
Even without a formal plan, a quick walk through with the PSAs identified 
multiple enhancements needed to improve the physical security of the property in 
preparation for all hazards. Although the walk through simply noted obvious deficiencies, 
incremental changes can ensure a building is ready for whatever may occur from illnesses 
to active assailants. Many of the doors in the church lack strike plates, which means the 
doors can easily be kicked in. An assailant is then able to enter a room where people are 
huddling for safety. Many of the exit signs in the church are missing, so if people enter an 
unfamiliar room, they may not know how to exit. Also, important to note that in 
emergency situations, these observations serve as reminders for people who may not be 
familiar with the space. Houses of worship desire to have safety and security for those 
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arriving on campus and attention to obvious safety issues can make the space more 
comfortable, inviting, and secure.244  
The PSAs also exposed less obvious, but more critical matters. The gas main for 
the church is not protected in any way, nor is the electrical panel that is in close proximity 
to the gas main. A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can possibly 
destroy the entire church. The front entrance to the church is also a target for a VBIED. 
The front entrance has been locked in recent years to cut down on the number of entries 
to the foyer prior to service, but as noted, the front entrance is in line with the road across 
the street. As such, it is not possible to stop a vehicle from traveling straight through the 
front door of the main building. Some rooms can be barricaded and blocked, but have no 
signage. An automated external defibrillator is on site, but the number of first aid kits 
needed increasing. The camera system for the facility has great coverage, but recent 
thefts have led to discussions that the holes in the coverage must be fixed. PSAs noted a 
great awareness among staff and that the current informal plan in place is a great start to a 
secure facility. NPC struggles with the same issues as other houses of worship in that a 
security plan is greatly desired, attempts are made to secure the site, but execution of said 
plan is lacking.245 
C. BUILDING AN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN 
Due to the size and complexity of the security needs at NPC, formalized planning 
is a necessity. The Safety Committee now understands the situation at NPC from the PSA 
site visit and from meetings with senior leadership. From this information, goals and 
objectives for the EOP were created through assessing the possible risks associated with 
the various threats. Outlining the purposes and scope of the plan provides direction to the 
committee as the plan developed courses of action (COA) to respond to hazards 
identified. Each COA is tied to a functional annex as a response to the threat occurring on 
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campus. The roles and responsibilities of each team member are spelled out in the EOP as 
suggested by FEMA.246  
Creating an EOP for NPC first meant determining possible risks to the campus.247 
The threat of such incidents as severe storms and natural hazards is rather low. The threat 
of theft is high and continues to rise on the campus and the greatest fear is that of an 
active assailant. With these two key issues in mind, developing a safety team and forming 
the functional annexes of response for the safety team became the primary focus of the 
EOP. The safety team is to be vigilant about possible threats and to respond to events 
occurring on campus where further assistance may be needed. Physical security activities 
were not addressed in the EOP, as the plan is directed at COAs to take in the event of an 
emergency. The plan assumes that doors can be locked and that shelter-in-place kits are 
housed in the proper place. Safety team members, in an ancillary role, bring safety 
matters to the attention of the committee. While the safety committee recommends 
decisions concerning the funding of new safety equipment or programs, the decision 
ultimately rests with the Northminster administration and leadership. 
The safety team’s role encompasses the planning and execution of functional 
annexes during an emergency situation. To fulfill this role, multiple decisions needed to 
be made. A key decision for any security plan is who will be in charge. Within the NPC 
EOP, the lead pastor or designee was determined to be the incident commander (IC). 
Some planners promote the idea that a member of the safety team should be the IC. 
However, the decision was made that the congregation would look to the lead pastor in an 
emergency situation, and not a safety team member.248 Another crucial decision is 
whether the safety team is an extension of the ministry of the ushers or a separate 
function. In meetings with lead ushers, it was determined that the role of the safety team 
needed to be filled by a separate group and that the ushers would take a secondary role in 
                                                 
246 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, 15. 
247 “Church Risk Assessments,” Ecclesiastical, January 5, 2018, https://www.ecclesiastical.com/risk-
management/church-risk-assessments/. 
248 Paul Maxwell, “Church Security and Safety: The Definitive Guide and 15 Best Practices,” Tithe.ly, 
May 7, 2019, https://get.tithe.ly/blog/church-security. 
55 
assisting the Welcome Team during any functional annex. How specific the language of 
each functional annex and COA was a final hurdle in writing the EOP. It was determined 
that general, flexible language was necessary in the descriptions of roles and procedures 
for safety team members. The inclusion of where to stand and when would limit the 
teams’ ability to act. A general language plan approach was used to allow for COAs and 
functional annexes to be easily understood and adaptable to multiple situations. 
With major decisions made regarding the overall goals and direction of the EOP, 
the actual plan was written. Decisions regarding maintenance of the plan, chain of 
command, and purpose were all included in the EOP. Roles and responsibilities of the 
various safety team members (IC, safety ministry team lead, welcome team, ushers, and 
children’s ministry team) were outlined. Each team member was given specific roles 
during any time the EOP was executed. COAs provide further specifics of what to do 
when an event occurs in the following categories: 
• Severe storm 
• Medical emergency 
• Fire 
• Utility failure 
• Hazardous material incident 
• Bomb threat 
• Active assailant 
• Abandoned child 
The active assailant COA is the priority. Particular attention was made to explain 
the different actions people were to take if an active assailant were to be discovered on 
campus. The run, hide, fight methodology was explained and the roles of safety team 
members in this scenario varied based on the situation at hand. As with all the COAs, 
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everyone’s personal safety is the primary goal with no expectation that any safety team 
members will be asked to sacrifice themselves. 
Each COA is attached to a functional annex. Essentially, the decision in each 
COA is to apply one or more of the functional annexes: evacuation, shelter-in-place or 
lockdown. In a severe storm, for instance, a shelter-in-place annex will be initiated while 
the course of action during a fire will be the institution of an evacuation protocol. Each 
functional annex describes the major roles of the IC and the safety team lead in each 
annex and the general actions taken to assist people on campus to the appropriate place. 
A final functional annex describes the membership, roles, and COAs for safety team 
members. 
Currently, the leadership has not approved the EOP. When the leadership does 
approve the NPC EOP, the next important steps are finding safety team volunteers and 
training stakeholders. Once the EOP is approved, members of the safety team can be 
recruited, approved, and trained. With a safety team in place, exercises and testing of the 
capability of the plan will happen next. Then, modifications to the security plan are sure 
to be made, as NPC continues to adapt to the needs of the congregation. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
Leaders of houses of worship are not sure what they need. Within the 
Northminster leadership, each person in a position of leadership has a voice and the 
needs, thoughts, and desires of each are different. Senior Pastor Ross wants to know what 
three things to say in an active assailant situation. Run, hide, fight is an answer; stay 
calm, pray, and listen to instructions is also an answer. Even with the dissemination of a 
plan that everyone agrees to abide by, some in the crowd are not going to know what to 
do and may panic no matter what is said from behind the pulpit. As NPC has taken the 
necessary steps through the planning process to implement a security plan, the capability 
of church leadership to understand possible threats and how to respond, ideally, will 
grow. 
Members of the NPC staff have grown in a knowledge and understanding of 
emergency operations planning. The growth in understanding of the planning process can 
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be transferred to other planning tasks within the church. The planning process outlined by 
FEMA used for this exercise is rather universal and can apply to such other long-term 
activities as maintenance and building growth. In learning the procedures and walking 
through an actual planning exercise, the amount of labor involved in standing up a 
security team is beyond expectations. Meeting with various groups and committees and 
coordinating schedules makes the planning process arduous. The dedication and time 
required to follow through can easily explain why NPC is in the third iteration of a 
security planning team. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Soft target mitigation is an expanding practice in the homeland security field as 
the number of hardened spaces grows and the aperture of soft targets closes. Those not 
committed to planning and modifying their soft spaces leave themselves most vulnerable 
as the threat continues to grow. The first step is recognizing a need to plan for threats and 
that those plans need to be tailored to fit each individual soft target. Houses of worship 
are particularly vulnerable and have become an ever-increasing target in recent years.249 
Assessing vulnerabilities and then planning for the worst-case scenarios are an integral 
step in defending the sacred spaces that religious orders occupy. More steps must be 
taken beyond planning to respond to threats and more must be done to determine the 
effectiveness of strategies already employed.  
A. KEY FINDINGS  
It is perceived that security planning is expensive, but the real expense is time and 
energy. Plans can be completed for next to nothing, but the missing piece is getting a 
dedicated team to perform the function. This team then must wade through a seemingly 
never-ending stream of information coming from the government, other houses of 
worship, and commercial vendors who all have ideas on how to harden a house of 
worship from attack. If a faith-based organization does have the time, working with CISA 
and walking through the planning documents offered by FEMA and the DHS can yield 
significant increases in a house of worship’s security posture. With less time and more 
money, off-the-shelf security plans are available, but no instrument exists to prove their 
effectiveness and even turnkey products require the development of a team. Success may 
come in a combination of factors where houses of worship link up through networks to 
share best practices and encourage each other to build a more robust security stance, as is 
seen in the Jewish community through the SCN.  
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Much information can assist an FBO in how to create or build a security plan. If 
anything, too much information is available and it takes a keen eye to wade through these 
hundreds of ideas to survey what is a best fit for any individual house of worship. Federal 
entities pay special attention to ensure that all their soft target planning is all-inclusive; 
yet, most commercial planning is done with “churches” in mind. So much so that even 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations recommends the use of a Christian-based 
commercial church security firm.250 Jewish institutions have a long-standing history of 
security planning. They have set up their own network to assist any institutions of the 
Jewish faith.251 Lesser-known organizations may be focused on protecting non-Judeo 
Christian organizations, but they are out of the public eye.  
The federal government must make material more user friendly. To create a 
security plan at NPC utilizing the FEMA Guide to Developing High-Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Houses of Worship took nearly nine months to get from the initial 
step of forming a collaborative team to the fifth of six steps: plan preparation, review, and 
approval. The plan is still pending approval before the actual implementation of the 
security can even occur. The time invested to create a fully functioning security team 
with an approved plan in place may take upwards of an entire calendar year. As seen at 
Northminster in the past, the likelihood of individuals sticking through the entire process 
as time passes on without a completed plan is low. A simpler solution from the federal 
government can be created. If a plug and play module was created for use in houses of 
worship, the impact would be significant. The major impetus of many commercial 
products is that they can get a security team up and running very quickly.252 Plans and 
offerings at the federal level for houses of worship can be tailored to better fit the 
immediate need of FBOs as they struggle to contend with threats and hazards. 
As funding is at a crossroads, houses of worship can look to a multitude of 
resources, including the federal government, for assistance. Many activities to assist in 
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securing religious sites can be done for free or low cost. The number of resources 
available through the federal and state governments is growing and FEMA has grants 
available specifically to address FBOs that may be at high risk of terrorist attacks.253 The 
DHS also offers a list of protective measures that houses of worship with limited security 
budgets can implement. Protective measures in the realm of procedures, personnel, and 
information sharing can all be done with no cost.254 Something as simple as securing 
trash containers and checking for locked doors during services can lessen the risk an 
organization has without spending.255 Implementing safety protocols and plans can also 
reduce the cost of insurance for houses of worship, which then offsets the costs of 
security measures.256 States offer security grants as well, sometimes with very few 
applicants.257 Multiple faith-based organizations can get together to form a “community 
security working group” to pool resources and hold joint trainings.258 A major concern is 
that there is a cost associated to being secure, and through risk management and proper 
planning, those matters can be addressed to prepare and possibly prevent tragedy 
Design elements can be created to retain the feel of a welcoming environment 
while bolstering security.259 Such elements as secure window film provide a safer shelter 
without sacrificing to aesthetics.260 Installation of planters along doorways to prevent 
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vehicle entry is aesthetically pleasing and can prevent tragedy.261 A shift in attitude and 
architecture can improve a house of worship’s security stance without a loss to the core 
mission of the site. 
As seen with the development of an emergency operations plan at NPC, the 
process of creating a plan is in itself inherently valuable and allows a faith-based 
community to answer questions necessary to improving site security. Identifying risks is 
an initial step in risk management.262 Involving partners like CISA allows a focused view 
on where the threats lie at that particular site. Other houses of worship can use the same 
resource to develop a list of security needs that can be addressed through a security 
planning committee. Once the needs were identified, the committee process showed how 
even basic planning operations become very site specific. The Safety Committee at 
Northminster struggled with the concept of who would be the IC on any particular day, as 
no specific chain of command exists within their church structure outside the lead pastor. 
Other houses of worship have similar issues with an incident command structure. For 
example, the Sikh faith that has no ordained leader and instead each gurdwara is run by a 
board of directors and services can be run by anyone in the faith. 263 The structure of an 
EOP with an incident commander would need to be modified to meet the needs of Sikh 
congregations. The difficulty in moving from a committee to an actual implemented plan 
is a lesson from which other houses of worship can learn. At this point, Northminster 
does not have an approved emergency operations plan, but it is not due to a lack of effort. 
This scenario is common in any planning process and any faith-based organization that 
undergoes a church security plan must be ready to meet strategic goals and deadlines to 
move the process forward.264  
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B. GROWING THREATS 
A muddled relationship between church and state is also building an undercurrent 
of mistrust within the United States. The fear within religious organizations of 
crackdowns on refugees and illegal aliens may prevent FBOs from reaching out to the 
DHS for help.265 As the government reaches out to provide more law enforcement 
support to houses of worship, the prevailing thought is that those communities will also 
report back to law enforcement about bad actors in their midst.266 Tensions over 
protecting the religious freedoms of individual members and the safety of the community 
as a whole have resulted. Other tensions arise as religious organizations are requested to 
help the government. FBOs have been assisting immigrant families released by the 
federal government and those who oppose the release of immigrants to the streets are 
now targeting those houses of worship.267 Federal policies in one department of the DHS 
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement) may be instigating a growing need for another 
department (FEMA) to reach out and educate houses of worship on how they can protect 
themselves.  
Current events outside the realm of government are also increasing the possible 
threats toward them. As religious organizations begin to reconcile with the past in which 
abusive relationships were accepted by the religious leaders, the more likely it is for 
people to come to the house of worship for help, which increases the possibility that more 
domestic conflicts will arrive at the door of the church.268 The growing anti-Semitic 
violence worldwide and the gamification of mass shootings has clearly placed mass 
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gatherings, which includes houses of worship, in the crosshairs.269 The most recent attack 
on a synagogue in Halle, Germany shows that attackers are attempting to make a 
spectacle of their hatred and that simple security measures (the doors to the synagogue 
were locked) can prevent tragedy.270 With the fear gathering at the gates of FBOs, their 
request for assistance from the government is going to continue to grow, which makes it 
all the more necessary for the government to respond. 
C. AVENUES OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
As this thesis outlined, even with the various resources available to houses of 
worship and the roadblocks to the implementation of any plan, many avenues of research 
are still needed to obtain a full picture of the faith-based security landscape. Investigation 
into implementation is the next step. Questions must be asked as to who is using the 
plans, at what level they are implemented, and are faith-based organizations continuing to 
plan as the threat evolves.  
Plans outlined have not necessarily been evaluated for effectiveness, whether the 
federal government or individual entities have developed them. It is not really possible to 
measure a security plan for effectiveness except by comparing it to other plans. The DHS 
measures plans through a protective measure index, which evaluates the weakest links in 
a security structure through resiliency measures.271 Measurements for effectiveness are 
elusive, and it is nearly impossible to measure if an activity prevents an attack without 
one occurring. No one wants an attack to occur, and the ability to measure one is usually 
only weighed against the best practices of others. 
Past the planning phase is the execution phase. What is missing in the execution 
phase and the hurdles in execution have not been discussed. The debate about whether 
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armed security in a place of worship is effective has not been discussed. Another avenue 
for further discussion is the reactions during an active assailant in the congregation. What 
did the congregation and any security staff do in an actual security event? If any training 
occurred prior to the event, did it change what happened and were lives saved? 
Other avenues of research within religious communities could yield value as well. 
Acknowledgement of the issues surrounding domestic violence within the religious 
community and creating tools to combat domestic violence through houses of worship 
was frequently discussed in various sources for this thesis. A further discussion into the 
connections that faith-based communities have with stopping domestic violence is 
warranted. Physical security has been discussed but cyber security for houses of worship 
need be explored, as a distinct vulnerability exists. Houses of worship and their role in 
disaster preparedness and recovery is another avenue worth exploring. 
This thesis attempted to provide a comprehensive look at the security landscape 
for houses of worship and filter them through the creation of a security plan for an 
individual faith-based organization. The difficulty of creating an EOP for an individual 
congregation is representative of the information found regarding church security. There 
are many voices, many ways to get to the finish line, and many ways to fall off the path 
and end up without improving the security posture of the sacred space. Site audits, 
planning committees, federal and local resources, and other religious orders are great 
places for a house of worship to start. Homeland security experts are just one key piece of 
the security puzzle for faith-based organizations. Internal security and threat mitigation 
planning has taken on a life of its own within houses of worship, especially within 
minority communities of the Jewish and Muslim faith. The experience gained by groups 
like the SCN must be sorted and disseminated for consumption by other FBOs. Sharing 
lessons learned by faith-based organizations can have a lasting effect of communal 
integration and collaboration, which thereby strengthens the community. 
As religious communities share lessons learned through security networks and 
information sharing, the bond between them will continue to grow. A threat to one 
religious community is a threat to all religious communities, as active assailants have not 
proved to be discretionary in their violence. Collaboration amongst security experts, the 
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government, and the FBOs can only create a stronger community prepared to protect the 
innocent. It is apparent that a compromise will not be made in the beliefs of a 
congregation for the sake of security. Houses of worship, though, no matter the belief 
system, appear very open to the idea of help. Recent mass shootings have galvanized the 
religious community to act and protect itself, which starts the conversation. Once faith-
based organizations open the door to homeland security operators, the opportunity exists 
to expand the conversation to all-hazards planning and training.  
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